

UNCLASSIFIED

INT 859/1

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March 23, 1949

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following notes contain a summary of the discussion at the 36th meeting of the National Security Council.

1. INTERNAL SECURITY

(NSC 1773; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated November 26, 1948, March 3, and March 21, 1949)

MR. SOUERS summarized developments since the Council became seized of the problem last April. He said that the Director of the Bureau of the Budget felt that NSC should move ahead by establishing the two committees, but at the same time give consideration to the questions of jurisdiction which Secretary Royall had raised.

MR. FORD said he had just been called to appear before an appropriations committee, but added that Mr. Ladd of the FBI was authorized to speak for the Department of Justice. Before he left, Mr. Ford said that the Department of Justice disagreed with Secretary Royall's statement, and adhered to the proposal in the March 3 memorandum, which should be put into effect as rapidly as possible.

SECRETARY ACHESON said he concurred with the March 3 proposal. He suggested, however, that the NSC representative referred to in paragraph 6, should consider the points raised in Secretary Royall's memorandum and make appropriate recommendations to the NSC in connection therewith. SECRETARY SNIDER agreed with this proposal.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL said that Secretary Royall was afraid that establishing the two committees would atrophy action.

MR. SOUERS remarked that it had to be assumed that the various ~~representatives~~ representatives on the committees would have a sense of responsibility and would move forward. While the best solution might be a single committee, or even one man, Mr. Souers said that this was a government of compromise, and we should move forward since there had been practically no progress in a year.

SECRETARY ACHESON suggested that the ICIS should be immediately constituted with Justice as chairman to draft the ICIS charter, instead of using the SANAAC committee, which State chaired. This, he felt, would be in line with the primary responsibility of

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NSC LTR. 6-18-42

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Justice in the matter. The ICIS, of course, could recommend a different permanent chairman if it wished.

SECRETARY ROYALL said his objection to the two committee proposal was based on three grounds. For one thing, he felt that a committee would never work as an operating mechanism. For the second thing, he felt that approval of this proposal, since it assumed to be the solution of the problem, would have a lethargic effect on further progress. Thirdly, he felt that there was a lack of definition of functions. For these reasons he felt that the proposal would be a backward, not a forward step; and he therefore opposed it.

MR. SOUFIS noted that the proposed committees would not be operational, since the respective departments and agencies would still perform their operating functions. MR. LADD said that Justice did not consider the committees operational. He also remarked that the IIC had apparently worked satisfactorily during the last war and he saw no reason why it couldn't do so again, especially in view of the additional backing it would now have.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL said that, while he was conscious of Secretary Royall's misgivings, he felt that the proposal was a step forward, which must be monitored and pushed.

MR. KENNETH noted that many committees had been effective, and agreed that this proposal was an essential first step. SECRETARY SNYDER also agreed.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

- a. Agreed, subject to a dissent by the Secretary of the Army, to recommend to the President that he approve a directive along the lines of the understanding between the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (contained in the reference memo dated March 3, 1949), as amended at the meeting.
- b. Subject to the approval by the President of the above recommendation, directed the NSC Representative on Internal Security to arrange for the prompt study of the points outlined by the Secretary of the Army in the reference memorandum dated March 21, 1949, and to submit for Council consideration such recommendations with respect thereto as are deemed appropriate.

NOTE: The proposed directive referred to in a above subsequently circulated as NSC 17/4, and submitted to the President, together with the dissent by the Secretary of the Army, for consideration.



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NOTE: Site for fourth airfield in same general area not yet selected.

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2. THE POSITION OF THE U. S. WITH RESPECT TO KOREA  
(NSC 8/1)

SECRETARY ACHESON referred to the comments of the Joint Chiefs on the paper and said that State accepted all the proposed changes. Since the other members had not all received them, he read them to the meeting and added a statement which he wished put in the Minutes with respect to the importance of the transfer of military equipment.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL asked about the progress of this program, and MR. MUCCIO replied that the transfer was about 70% complete. SECRETARY ROYALL suggested that Mr. Muccio consult with the Department of the Army about the completion of this program before Mr. Muccio left for Korea the next day.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL asked about internal conditions in Korea. MR. MUCCIO replied that there had been improvement since the uprising last October, but that there were still many question marks which constituted a calculated risk that had to be taken.

SECRETARY ROYALL remarked that the paper specified numbers for the Korean Army and Air Force but did not for the Coast Guard. He understood that the figure of 4,000 had been approved for the coast guard and suggested that, if there was no dispute on that figure, it be put in in order to avoid possible later embarrassment.

MR. MUCCIO said that question had been discussed by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, which had felt that the functions of a coast guard were so well understood that there was no need for definition.

SECRETARY ACHESON agreed that the number should be inserted.

MR. HOFFMAN said he approved the paper.

In response to SECRETARY FORRESTAL's question, SECRETARY ROYALL said the withdrawal date was okay, and added that he thought the paper was an excellent solution of a tough problem.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

- a. Adopted NSC 8/1 subject to amendment of paragraphs 2-b-(6), 3-a, 3-c, 3-d, 3-e, 3-f-(1), 3-f-(2), and 3-f-(3) thereof.



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- b. Noted the following statement by the Secretary of State:

"In approving this Paper in its revised form, I wish to emphasize the view, which is held by the Department of State, that the success of the policy set forth therein may well be dependent upon the adequacy of the transfer of military equipment and supplies provided for in paragraph 3-d in furnishing the Korean Government with effective security forces equipped to fill immediately the gap left by the withdrawal of U. S. occupation forces and to bridge the critical period until military assistance to be provided under pending legislation begins to flow. It is our understanding that this transfer is well on its way to completion and that the reserves referred to in the subject paragraph as 'emergency' will be adequate to meet the foregoing desideratum."

NOTE: NSC 8/1, as amended, subsequently circulated as NSC 8/2 and submitted to the President for consideration.

3. U. S. OBJECTIVES WITH RESPECT TO GREECE AND TURKEY TO COUNTER SOVIET THREATS TO U. S. SECURITY  
(NSC 42)

SECRETARY ACHESON said that paragraph 36 looked as though we had not examined alternatives in coming to our conclusions on this problem. Accordingly, he proposed to delete the paragraph and insert an appropriate sentence in paragraph 33.

SECRETARY ACHESON said he also felt that paragraph 38, on airfields in Turkey, should be taken out and made the subject of a new paper. He said that State had originally approved the idea when Secretary Symington had first proposed it several months ago, but there had been a number of developments since, including the Atlantic Pact. He wondered whether it was good now to be making such arrangements with Turkey. He mentioned that Iceland, Norway, and Denmark had all told us that we could not have air bases in their countries. He said there was a danger of the appearance that we were encircling the USSR with a lot of jumping-off places. Therefore, he felt we should take a good look at this matter before asking the President to make a decision on it. He added that, if there was feeling that this matter was inseparable from the rest of the Paper, he was willing to hold up the whole Paper.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL asked how soon this reconsideration could be completed. MR. RUSK said there was no reason why it could not be done within the next month and remarked that the same conclusion might be reached at that time.



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SECRETARY ACHESON said he wished to re-examine this whole matter of peripheral bases, and proposed that the Council approve the Paper but refer paragraph 38 to State for re-examination.

SECRETARY ROYALL said he felt fields were essential there.

SECRETARY SYMINGTON agreed that the Paper should be approved and forwarded, and that the airfield question might be considered separately. SECRETARY SYLVER also agreed.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

- a. Adopted NSC 42 subject to the deletion of paragraphs 27, 28, 36 and 38, and to amendment of paragraph 33.
- b. Agreed that the Department of State should submit for Council consideration within the next three weeks its views, after re-examination, of the desirability of seeking an arrangement with the Turkish Government which would permit the construction of airfields adequate for the operations envisaged in U. S. strategic plans.

NOTE: NSC 42, as amended, subsequently circulated as NSC 42/1 and submitted to the President for consideration. The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for implementation.

4. AIRFIELD CONSTRUCTION  
(NSC 45)

SECRETARY ACHESON remarked that Secretary Forrestal had spoken to him of this matter before and it had been agreed to put it before the Council.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL said that according to Air Force planning these bases were needed. The main question was the unwillingness of the British to pay for them, since the British wished to use their money for other purposes. He felt that the cost was reasonable and not too large for the British to bear, since they had a reasonable interest in the bases, too.

SECRETARY SYMINGTON pointed out the location of the bases.  
(See attached maps).

GENERAL NORSTAD said our B-29 groups in England were all exposed at their present bases. All JCS plans, he said, would require at least this number of fields. The present bases did not permit adequate defense because of the exposure on the coastal side.



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SECRETARY ACHESON commented that apparently there was no argument on the merits of the case, and that the only question was, who would pay for them. GENERAL NORSTAD agreed and said that the British had originally proposed to begin the first year's work on the bases in England, at a cost of \$4 million, but their treasury had cracked down on them. The same thing had happened with respect to the Suez fields. General Norstad said he had talked with Lord Tedder only two weeks ago and had got the impression that Lord Tedder did not consider British payment a closed deal. General Norstad said there was greater urgency for the Suez than the English bases, since the British had succeeded in persuading the Egyptian Government to make available certain critical materials. If these materials were not used soon, they might be lost.

SECRETARY ACHESON agreed that the Council might ask the President to direct the Department of State to proceed with negotiations, using either the Atlantic Pact or the Military Assistance Program as the framework.

MR. SOUFERS proposed that the Council:

- a. Agree that the development of adequate airfields in the United Kingdom and in the Cairo-Suez area, required for current emergency war plans, is in the interests of national security.
- b. Agree to recommend to the President that the Department of State be authorized to undertake negotiations with the British Government, on the highest levels necessary, regarding the provision of funds required for the construction of such airfields.

SECRETARY ROYALL said that the Department of the Army recommended that action not be taken on this matter until it had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

GENERAL NORSTAD, in reply to a query, said that this matter had not been referred to the Joint Chiefs since normally it was of a type on which decisions were taken by the respective departments. The requirement for bases, he said, was in all JCS plans; and the normal practice was for each department to develop the implementation of these plans.

SECRETARY ROYALL said his staff paper stated there was no sound basis now for the need of four bases, and there was the further



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question of cost involved, particularly, whether the British estimates might be too high.

He added that Navy had concurred that the Joint Chiefs should be consulted.

SECRETARY ACHESON remarked that this was obviously a matter for consideration within the National Military Establishment.

SECRETARY SYMINGTON said that the discussion supported the wisdom of the President's position that there should be one military representative on the Council.

In reply to Secretary Symington's question, SECRETARY FORRESTAL said it was obvious that a check should be made with the Joint Chiefs.

GENERAL NORSTAD said, in extenuation, that this would be a new procedure.

MR. KENNEY remarked that it was not good to attack the question of bases piecemeal.

SECRETARY ROYALL suggested that the paper be approved subject to a check with the JCS. MR. KENNEY agreed with this procedure.

SECRETARY ACHESON proposed that the matter be handled through the NSC Staff.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

- a. Agreed that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject should be obtained prior to Council action.
- b. Referred NSC 45 to the NSC Staff for the preparation of a report to the Council in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject.

NOTE: The action in a above subsequently submitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.

5. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR INTELLIGENCE

(Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 24, March 2, and March 8, 1949)

MR. SOUFERS reported that there was such a volume of comments on the Survey Group Report that he felt a meeting should be held shortly devoted solely to this subject. He suggested that the Council might



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care to appoint a committee of three, including representatives of the National Military Establishment and the Department of State to point up the issues for Council action.

SECRETARY ACHESON said he had found the basic report difficult to read and, in addition, had comments by his staff almost twice as long as the report. He wondered if the Council could have the analysis of the issues before a meeting.

MR. SOUERS said there would be great suspicion of such an analysis, but he felt that the papers included a lot of administrative matters which the Council need not concern itself with. He felt the Council might approve certain concepts and even set up a mechanism to watch over the execution of these concepts. One such issue was the question of a civilian director.

MR. ACHESON inquired if the NSC Staff could not prepare the analysis.

MR. SOUERS replied that the Staff would tie back to the representative intelligence chiefs once again, whereas what was needed was a fresh appraisal by two or three good neutral men backed up by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, in order to avoid departmental partisan feeling.

SECRETARY FORRESTAL commented that the Department of Justice would probably add some acid remarks.

MR. LAY said that the Hoover Commission Reports had made recommendations in intelligence matters, and, in effect, these were also before the Council for consideration in connection with the present study.

MR. SOUERS remarked that there had been some informal indication that State might undertake such an analysis of the issues.

SECRETARY ACHESON agreed that the Department of State, with the assistance of the Executive Secretary, could prepare an analysis purporting to be its judgment of the main concepts. This could then be used more or less as an agenda for a debate on the issues.

MR. LAY added that there was also a need for a statement of recommended Council actions.

SECRETARY ACHESON suggested that the Council consider two meetings on the subject: the first to discuss the problems, and the second to sharpen the issues to decisions.

He added that his Hoover Commission experience had shown that it was profitable to spend three-fourths of the time on an examination of the problem, after which the solution would arise in the remaining quarter.



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## THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Agreed that the Department of State should prepare, for Council consideration at an early meeting, a statement of the issues involved in the reference papers on this subject.

NOTE: The above action subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for implementation.

6. REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION  
(CIA 3-49)

## THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Noted the reference report on the subject by the Director of Central Intelligence.

7. NSC STATUS OF PROJECTS

## THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:

Noted the status of NSC projects as of March 14, 1949.

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Airfields Currently Utilized by USAF


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Airfields Selected for Extension and Improvement

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
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